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BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
This study is an attempt to investigate the effect of a situational
variable on verbal statements of expectancy. Specifically, the variable
selected was that of goal value. It has long been recognized that there is
often an intimate relationship between expectancy statements and goal value.
However, just what that relationship might be is rather obscure.
The study was carried out within the general framework of Rotter's
"Social Learning Theory" (14). Whereas social learning theory utilizes both
expectancy and reinforcement, other current approaches tend to be classifiable
into two major categories. One set of attempts stresses the application of
reinforcement theory, for example, the work of Dollard and Miller (5),
Mowrer (11), and Brown and Farber (1). Another set of approaches including
Tolman (15)* Brunsvdk (2), Krech (8), and Postman (13)* stresses the con-
struct of expectancy or hypotheses.
Rotter's theory utilizes as a basic formula for behavior the
following (14)
t
B *p«x,al,ra s *(Ex,ra,sl & R.V.a)
This may be read as follows: The potential for behavior x to occur in situa-
tion 1 in relation to reinforcement a is a function of the expectancy of the
occurrence of reinforcement a following behavior x in situation 1, and the
value of reinforcement a. The full theoretical formulation includes a num-
ber of additional constructs which relate to the two basic constructs of the
formula. Prediction of behavior requires that at least two behavior poten-
tials be calculated so that prediction may be stated in terms of tba relative
potentiality of one behavior or another occurring. It is assumed that this
is a basic formula for complex behaviors in a social situation. Expectancy
2is defined in social learning theory as a subjective probability held by the
individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as a function of, or
in relation to, a specific behavior in a given situation(s). Behavior poten-
tial may be defined as the potentiality of any given behavior occurring in
any given situation(s) as calculated in relation to any single reinforcement
or set of reinforcements. Reinforcement value is defined as the degree of
preference for any reinforcement to occur if the possibilities of their
occurring were all equal. This concept of reinforcement, however, does not
stem from drive-reduction theory but perhaps might better be described as
utilizing an "empirical law of effect."
There can be little doubt that for the same behavior an individual
expects different outcomes in different situations. Situations, experimental
or natural, are composed of cues that lead to expectancies for various be-
havior-reinforcement sequences. Thus, the aggression on the playground may
be highly acceptable and reinforced while that same behavior may be strongly
negatively reinforced in the home situation. The individual^ categorization
of the situation determines his expectancy that a given behavior will be fol-
lowed by a given reinforcement. To predict complete generality of behavior
in all situations seems inconsistent with common sense observations
.
One specific cue in situations that may be assumed to have an effect
upon expectancies is the value of the goal object or reinforcement. That is,
does a high reinforcement value tend to lower or raise stated expectancies,
or does it have no effect? For example, when the individual is in a competi-
tive situation where the stakes are high does he tend to raise or lower his
stated expectancy for being successful as compared to a situation where the
stakes are low?
3Behavior expectancies do not always appear to be governed by "realistic"
factors in a situation, but seem also to be a function of wishes, fears, and
doubts. Observers disagree, however, about the manner in which differen-
tially valued goals affect expectancies. Some believe, for example, that
expectancies are lowered, in the face of highly valued goals, as evident in
the student before an examination, while others maintain that they are raised,
as in a gambling situation.
Marks(lO) and Irwin (7) have done studies aimed at demonstrating that
expectancies are biased by wishfulness. In the task devised by Marks and
later used by Irwin, 20 packs of 10 cards each were assembled, with one,
three, five, seven, or nine of the cards marked in some way. The subject
was asked to state on each trial whether he thought that one of these marked
cards would be drawn after the pack had been shuffled. In one condition, the
subjects were told that they would gain a point, if such a card were drawn
j
in another, they would lose a point. The event of drawing a narked card was
thus made desirable in one instance, undesirable in another. The number of
marked cards in the deck constituted the objective probability of the event,
ranging from 10 to 90 percent. Both authors found that, although the proba-
bility level did influence the expectancy statements, the desirability of
the event greatly and consistently biased them: if ths event were desirable
it was expected at a much higher level than objective probability, and if
undesirable at a much lower level.
Crandall, et al. (4) repeated the Marks and Irwin studies with certain
modifications. The principle difference was that he put mere of a premium on
accuracy of guesses by emphasis in instructions. His results, nevertheless,
resembled those of Marks and Irwin but had less magnitude. Expectancy
4statements were raised when reinforcement values were high, especially when
objective probability was equal to .50.
Worell (16) systematically examined the effect of desirability on expect-
ancy statements and found in opposition to Marks, Irwin and Crandall a sig-
nificant tendency for expectancies to be lower for the more valued events
than for the less valued ones. He used elementary school boys as subjects,
and gave them three level of aspiration tasks defined as measuring ability
in motor skill, pointing out the pertinence of these to athletic ability.
The three tasks wars presented sc that one was introduced as a ''very impor-
tant" test of athletic ability, the second as not quite so important, and
the third as not nearly so important, or much more inferior to the others.
In this situation, the subjects' D-seores (the difference between the
expected seore and the preceding performance) were significantly lowest on
the "most important" test and the highest on the "least important" test. The
effect of the value of the event, then, tended to lower, rather than raise,
expectancy statements.
How, then, is one to explain the different results in the data of Marks,
Irwin, Crandall, and IVorell. If one examines the data, one can see that
Marks and Irwin used almost strictly chance-guessing situations; Crandall,
perhaps, lessened this influence by stressing accuracy of guess and V.'orell
used an achievement-type situation. Therefore, it could be said that the
experliiental situations in these studies could be placed on a continuum.
Also, it can be noted that the obtained results fail onto a similar continuum.
Marks and Irwin got results indicating desirable events are anticipated more
frequently than undesirable ones . Crandall got the same results but with
less magnitude. Worell, using a very different situation, got reverse
5results. 21acs V&rks. and Irwin used sl-rict gx<aasj£g situations with little
premium on accuracy they undoubtedly got a lot of wishful guesses *'hich could
acjxLsin their data. Cran;iall probably reduced the .'iaiiful element. Then,
Worell's results are certainly incompatible with the principle of wishful-
ne»3, Thay would seen understandable, however, in terms of the scaially-
expected behavior in such a situation. Hare, stating expectancies for
success night be perceived as bragging. Even if it were not, the cultural
mode would 3eem to dictate a certain amount of self-effacing when asked to
assess one's own competence in such a skill. The college basketball star,
when complimented, is virtually expected to nay, "It was nothing; it was
the team that did it".
In Worell's explanation of the picture of inconsistency between the
studies, he notes that at leagt two broad divisions of situations may be dis-
tinguished: achievement and nonachievement. In the fcrmer, performance is
dependent upon ability and skill, and thus reflects ths individual's compe-
tence. In the latter, neither ability or skill is prominently involved, and
an individual's competence is not challenged. This distinction appears to
assist in resolving disparities in the results of such st tidies as Marks' and
Vtorell's. Marks' results strongly indicate that increased value led to in-
creased expectations. According to Vforell's analysis, her study would fall
within the nonachievement category, since the children were expressing what
they wanted to happen; no ability or skill was implied. In this sense, her
subjects were faced with a form of gambling, and culturally, one may find a
greater tendency to take risks in these situations. In '.Vorell's study, per-
formance was related to ability, so an additional goal value was introduced.
6Additionally, Lasix (?) recognised a distinction between learning in a
situation where the effects following behavior are a fraction of the behavior
itself and learning in a situation where the subsequent effect or reinforce-
ment is essentially controlled by someone else accextiiag to soc£ prearranged
sequence. It appears that the difference in situations lies in what the
subject perceives I'.ji wccurzvncs or rsinforceaent to be a function of, that
1-, ue a result ci his periormnce, or on a basis independent oi his perform-
ance. Ihfttlf this unaiyeis as a cue, ihares (12; employed two level of
aspiration tasks, uie was introduced Id the subject as involving his skill
in leaking cuscriminutiens, oi the ether the subject was told that success
was almost entirely a function of luck. It was found that expectancy state-
ments changed Bigniiicanv^y more xri the "skill" than in the "luck" task,
tfcftl supported a previous suggestion by iVorell that systematic uiinferences
in expectancy statements could be expected between "skill" and "luck" tasks.
It thus appears that the situation is an effective datum in the pre-
diction of expectancies. The above cited research suggests that verbal
expectancies may be higher in non-achievement than in achievement situations.
It would alEo appeal* that skill situations may be classified under the head-
ing of achievement situations while chance or luck situations are classifiable
under non-achievement.
Ui the basis of the foregoing assumptions, the following hypothesis was
|ormulatedi
ixpectancy statements v.iii le lower in a situation generally
categorised by subjects as involving his skill than in a situation
generally categorised as chance.
Skill situation is defined as one wherein a subject's score (a reinforcement,
either positive or negative) reflects his ability. Chance situation is
7defined as one wherein a subject's score is dependent upon luck or experiment-
er's whim rather than ability. The skill situation represents a challenge
to the subject's competence and is a situation in which the goal value is
high. It is presumed that the high value of the reinforcement will induce
a certain amount of defensiveness in the form of lowered stated expectancies.
In the chance situations, on the other hand, there is no implication of com-
petency and thus no apparent threat, so the subject can "afford" to have high
expectancies. Thus, it is presumed that in skill situations that challenge
subject's competency the high goal value of success operates as a cue which
may lead to lowered expectancy statements.
Next, it was further assumed that people vary along a continuum of to
what extent they tend to more or less categorize all situations as achievement
situations. Presumably, some people have a generalized expectancy or set
which leads thsm to categorize most situations as skill or achievement domin-
ated. On the basis of these assumptions, the second hypothesis was:
Subjects with high achievement scores tend to state lower ex-
pectancies in both skill and chance situations than subjects with low
achievement scores.
This hypothesis would be consistent with our first one. That is, achievement
situations tend to result in lower stated expectancies as a function of de-
fensiveness, cultural factors, etc.
The instrument used to get achievement scores was the Edward's Personal
Preference Schedule (6), which will be more fully described in the Methodology
Chapter.
The third hypothesis was similar to the second hypothesis and based on
the assumption that people vary in terms of how much they tend to generally
categorize situations as chance. Thus, it was predicted that:
3Subjects who obtain high scores on a test designed to measure
one's generalized expectancy for chance determination of events will
tend to state higher expectancies for success in both chance and
skill situations than will people with low chance scores.
The instrument designed for this hypothesis is shown in Appendix B.
METHODOLOGY
Fifty-nine female students from general psychology classes were utilized
in this study. After the first seven subjects were run, it was decided to
rewrite the instructions, primarily for the sake of brevity and clarity.
These seven subjects were then discarded. Two others were later discarded
due to incomplete data. This left a total of 50 female students used in the
study. Subjects were drawn from general psychology courses in which one of
the requirenents is participation in two hours of psychological experiments.
The true nature of the experiment was disguised and none of the subjects ap-
peared to question the experiment as structured to them (see instructions,
Appendix C).
It will be recalled that the first hypothesis stated essentially that
the subjects would state higher expectancies in chance situations than in
skill situations. A major consideration centered about the notion that ob-
tained results must rest on the subjects' categorizations of the tasks and
not on some inherent quality of the tasks themselves. Thus, assurance was
wanted that obtained results would not be merely a function of having used
two different tasks. Therefore, what was needed was two tasks that could be
interchanged as chance and skill. It was felt that this could be accomplished
through changes in instructions with regard to the tasks. Thus, for half
the subjects, Task A would be structured as chance and Task B as skill, and
for the other half, Task A as skill and Task B as chance. The comparison of
9expectancy levels would then be made between all skill situations V3. all
chance situations, rather than between Task A and Task B. Two tasks, differ-
ent from each other, and yet comparable enough that aach could be structured
in either of two ways were devised. Both tasks needed enough face validity
to be convincingly both skill and chance, depending upon instructions. Each
subject was used as his own control to obviate matching problems and also
reduce the number of subjects necessary.
Task A (Color)
This task consisted of ten 2 by 3 inches sample paint chips of varying
shades of yellow, on different colored 4 by 6 inches sheets of construction
paper (Appendix A). These were, in turn, placed on a large board in two rows
of five cards each. These will subsequently be called the standard colors.
These same ten colored chips, reduced in size to 2 by 1 inch were pasted,
separately, on regular 3 by 5 inches unlined, white filing cards (Appendix A).
Each card's chip matched the color of one on the board exactly. These colors
will subsequently be called the matching colors.
Task B (Length)
This task consisted of ten 1/2 inch wide strips of black construction
paper ranging from 1 to 2-1/8 inches in length. The difference in length
between any two adjacent size strips was 1/8 inch. Each of the ten strips
was pasted, separately, on 3 by 5 inches white filing cards, but at varying
angles (Appendix A). All of the cards were then mounted or. a large board.
These will subsequently be called the standard lengths. These same ten
strips, color other than black, were pasted at varying angles on 2 by 2-1/2
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inches white cards, and each card's strip *** exactly the saite length as one
on the board (Appendix A). These strips will subsequently be called the
matching lengths.
Red, white and blue chips, 1.5 inches in diameter, served as the objects
used in the betting aaeasure of expectancy. The subjects vere informed that
the color of the chips had nothing to do with the value of the chip.
Experimental Groups
The groups were sec up in the following manner:
Table 1. Experimental groups.
Groxvp* : Order of Presentation
i
1st 2nd
I Color (chance instructions) Length (skill instructions)
II Color (skill instructions) Length (chance instructions
)
III Length (chance instructions) Color (skill instructions)
IV Length (skill instructions) Color (chance instructions)
Kach group of subjects was run in its entirety before going on to the next
group. The groups were run in the order of II, IV, I, and III. It can be
seen from Table 1 that order of presentation was balanced as was the manner
in which each task was structured to tfoa subjects.
Experimental Procedure
Before the subject entered the room, 20 stacks of 10 chips each were
placed on the table at which she was to be seated. The board containing the
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standard lengths or colors \he.$ placed on a chair in • vertical position ap-
proDctaately 10 fe&t from wbsr* the su'ojeci sat. As coon s* she- was com-
fortable one of the sets of instructions was read to her iepeniir-j? upon the
group to which she had been assigned. Basically, there were two types of
instructions. The first type structured the initial task a? chance ani the
second task as skill. The second type structured the initial task as skill
and the second task as chance. Hcv;e?or, for oash type the fora and color
tasks were interchanged, thus asking a total of four instructions. Thsss are
reproduced in Appendix C. The tasks required the subject to sateh the
matching colors (or lengths) with the standard colors (lengths) on the board.
Each subject was given 10 trials of notching on each task and the sequence
of positive and negative reinforceins nt MM) the MUM for every subject in
both situations. The sequence WM as follows:
TsMe ?. Fixed sequence of reinforcement
Trial
1 1 1 I J : 4 : 5 : 6 : 7 s 3 : 9 : 10
»XX-X---X X
x equals positive reinforcement (correct matching or success)
• equals negative reinforcement (incorrect matching or failure)
Although in fact both situations isere chares as far as subject being
correct w?.$ concerned, the instructions apparently exerted a strong effect.
Subjects did not recognize that they were being reinforced eiasilarly in both
situations. Thus, because of initial structure, siibjects categorized the
taeke differently and, therefore, reacted differently, JSany spontaneous
coa&ients attested to the fact that none of the subjects questioned the report
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of failure or success for any given trial even though in reality it may have
contradicted their actual performance.
Any of the instructions were repeated, explained cr elaborated if the
subject did not seem to understand fully.
The measure of expectancy used was a betting technique developed by
Castaneda (3). This method correlates .99 with other verbal methods, al-
though the betting method yields somewhat higher expectancies. Before each
matching trial the subject was asked to bet from one to ten chips as to
whether she would be correct in catching. Other work has indicated that chips
are as feasible for betting as small amounts of money (Phares 12). During
the betting the experimenter recorded the number of chips bet each time and
also a cumulative total of chips won to lend reality to the situations.
In testing the second hypothesis, the subjects were given the Edwards
Personal Preference Schedule if they had not already taken it during orienta-
tion week at the college. Those Edward's that the experimenter administered
were scored by the experimenter. The rest of the scores were obtained from
the Counseling Center.
The Edward's Personal Preference Schedule was designed primarily as an
instrument for research and counseling purposes, to provide quick and con-
venient measures of a number of relatively independent nornal personality
variables. In addition to the 15 personality variables, the Personal
Preference Schedule provides a measure of test consistency and a measure of
profile stability. The description of the ach (Achievement) score is as
follows: (6)
To do one's best, to be successful, to accomplish tasks requiring
skill and effort, to be a recognized authority, to accomplish some-
thing of great significance, to do a difficult job well, to solve
13
difficult problems and puzzles, to be able to do things better than
others, to write a great novel or play.
As yet, the Personal Preference Schedule can demonstrate no validity data of
any consequence, although various self-ranking studies have been done. In
some cases subjects, self-ranking, agreed perfectly with their Personal
Preference Schedule rankings, but in others, there was little agreement.
Correlations between the Personal Preference Schedule and the Taylor Manifest
Anxiety Scale and the Guilford-Martin Personnel Inventory were run. Some of
the correlations were significant, but more were not.
For scores the experimenter used ranks because the strength of the
achievement need could only be judged in relation to the other 14 needs.
In testing the third hypothesis, a specially devised 13-item question-
naire was given (Appendix B). This was administered at the conclusion of
the experimental tasks.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The data from the first hypothesis were analyzed in the following man-
ner; for each subject, two scores, one for the chance situation and the other
for the skill situation, were computed from the stated expectancies (bets) by
taking the mean of these bets in each situation. Only the first nine trials
Tiere used in the computation. The data for all hypotheses were computed from
an | of 50.
Table 3- Results of hypothesis I
Meant chance situation: 4*5
Mean: skill situation: 5»5
Difference between means: -1.0
t: -17.1
P: < .001
It can readily be seen from the above results that the data turned out
to be highly significant but in the reverse of the predicted direction. This
study represented essentially an attempt to extend .Vorell's analysis to
chance vs. skill situations. Instead, the obtained results would tend to fit
into the framework of the Marks-Irwin-Crandall studies. The importance of
the findings lie in a further, amphatie demonstration of the importance of
the situation in determining human behavior. It will be recalled that the
only thing different in the chance and skill situations was the instructions
—
nurrber of positive reinforcements, sequence, etc., were all identical in each
case
—
yet ths resultant stated expectancies were quite divergent.
If the assumption is made that the methodology was adequate to test the
hypothesis, than the framework behind the hypothesis must be rejected. How-
ever, it does not appear that 7?orell*s achievement vs. non-achievement
analysis should be summarily rejected. Further experimentation may reveal
that his analysis is valid for certain classes of individuals, but does not
possess complete generality. The possibility exists as well that chrono-
logical age is a factor. That is, perhaps the effect of goal value on stated
expectancy varies as a function of chronological age.
A T»re basic factor probably resides in the nature of ths situations
themselves. Thus, we may be forced to accept the fact that no absolute pre-
scriptions for the effect of goal value upon stated expectancies can be made
aside from the particular situation. That is, the particular effect can be
predicted only from an intensive study of the situational cues present and
the past expectancy-reinforcement history of the individual. To simply
classify a situation as achievement or as one in which the goal value is high
may be too gross a description. There can be no assurance that subjects will
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so categorize the si tuition. Any situation is cosposei ox may cues. Which
set of cues the subject fixes upon 30 as to stimulate a given expectancy may
be at variance with those the experimenter is interested in. Most situations
lend themselves to many different categorizations depending on the past his-
tory and the present state of the subject.
Then, too, it has often been noted that the statement of high expec-
tancies is somathing that a subject may perceive as leading to reinforcement,
either from the culture generally, or from experimenter in particular. Thus,
the tendency to over-state expectancies and the reverse tendency, self-
effacement, may be behaviors that are, to a large degree, sitnationally
determined. To arbitrarily predict either tendency without study of the
situational cues present may well be ill-advised.
Specifically, it had been hoped that the subject in this study would
perceive the skill situation as a threat or challenge to their competency.
The task was purposely structured as involving aptitude in interior dseor-
ating since it was assumed that, for females, this would arouse motivation.
It was also intended that the subjects categorize the chance situation as one
wherein they "had nothing to lose," and could affox-d to state high expectan-
cies since no threat to their competence could be involved. However, it
seems apparent that subjects did not categorize the situations on this con-
tinuum. Instead, they seemed to perceive the chance situation as being so
difficult that they lowered their expectancies. In the skill situation they
seemingly felt they had more opportunity for being correct and thus raised
their expectancy. This analysis is essentially confirmed by subsequent
interviews with 5 of the subjects. In this sense, the study did not test
ISorell's analysis. That is, it is unlikely that achiovement-non-achievement
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categorizations were aroused, but instoau, MOM Wtegorizcticn or. the basis
of degree of difficulty. At any rate, it is apparent that achievement vs.
non-achievement cannot be simply extended to skill vs. chence.
The data for the second hypothesis were handled in the following fashion:
first, the 13 subjects 'who scored highest on the Edwards Personal Preference
Schedule (on the basis of their r achievement rank) were compared with the
13 subjects who scored lowest on the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule.
The comparison was a t test based on the subjects' mean expectancy scores in
the two situations. Then, product-moment correlations were calculated be-
tween all subjects' mean expectancy scores in the tv.o situations and their
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule r achievement ranks. None of the tests
were significant. Thus, on the basis of obtained results, Hypothesis 2 was
not confirmed.
Table 4. Results of hypothesis 2.
Mean for High achievement scorers: chance situation: 4.69
Mean for Lew achievement scorera- chance situation: 4.68
Difference between means: .01
t: .0146
ttMfll for High achievement scorers; skill situation; 6.01
Mean for Low achievement scorers: skill situation: i>.52
Diii'erenco between means: »49
t: .0768
r between Mwards and chance mean scores: - .01
r between Edwards and skill mean scores: - .18
The data for the third hypothesis was handled in the following fashion:
first, the 11 subjects who scored highest on the 13-item chance questionnaire
weie ccmpiired with the 11 subjects who scored lowest on the chance question-
naire. The comparison was a t teat based on the subjects' mean expectancy
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scores in the two situations. Then, product-moment correlations were calcu-
lated between all subjects' mean expectancy scores in the two situations and
their chance questionnaire scores. None of the tests were significant.
Thus, on the basis of obtained results, Hypothesis 3 was not confirmed.
Table 5. Results of hypothesis 3-
Mean for High chance scorers: chance situation: 4.57
Mean for Low chance scorers: chance situation: 4.39
Difference between means: .18
t: .3867
Mean for High chance scorers: skill situation: 5.45
Mean for Low chance scorers: skill situation: 5.79
Difference between means: - .34
t: - .5434
r between Questionnaire and chance mean scores: .09
r between Questionnaire and skill mean scores: .06
It was assumed that individuals would vary along a dimension of how much
they tend to categorize all situations as achievement or non-achievement. To
measure this generalized expectancy the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule
was used. The same procedure was utilized for the chance dimension using the
"chance questionnaire." One would presume that individuals at either end of
either dimension would over-generalize to any given situation, regardless of
whether it be chance or skill, and tend to categorize it as either chance or
skill, respectively. In other words, a highly chance-oriented person would
tend to see the skill situation as more like chance than one who was skill
(achievement) or non-chance oriented. The skill-oriented person would tend
to see both situations more as skill.
The lack of significant results on both the Edwards and the Questionnaire
may be explicable for either of two reasons. First, it may be true that
IS
neither the chance nor the skill (achievement) dimension is generalized
enough to permit the obtaining of measurable effects in all situations.
Thus, for example, behavior may be enough situationally determined that pre-
diction of behavior on the basis of non-achievement is not feasible. That
is, no need is generalized enough to influence behavior in all situations.
Secondly, the potential inadequacy of both measuring instruments may
have resulted in lack of results. Assuming that the above two dimensions are
legitimate, there are no data demonstrating the validity of either instrument.
The questionnaire was especially designed for this study and has not yet been
fully studied. The same is true of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule.
Although several studies have been published on the Edwards Personal Prefer-
ence Schedule, they are basically not validity studies. So far, the user of
the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule must rely on "face validity"j a very
risky venture.
Furthermore, in view of the results of the test of ths first hypothesis,
it is questionable whether the second and third hypotheses are legitimate.
These latter predictions would be subject to the same criticisms and con-
siderations that were made in relation to the first hypothesis.
SUMMARY
The mjor purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a situa-
tional variable on verbal statements of expectancy. It was hypothesized that
the subject who categorises a situation as 3kill would give lower statements
of expectancy than subjects v=ho categorized a situation as chance. This pre-
diction was based in part on Worell's study where goals of high value, which
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wore related to ability or skill, resulted in loser statenants of expectancy
then in thoss situations which had low goal values.
In order to test this hypothesis two experimental tasks were designed.
On© involved the etching of colors and the othor, tha matching of lengths
of lines. A total of 50 female subjects were used, broken down into four
groups. Group one first received the color task structured as chancs, then
the lins task structured -ia skill. The second, group received the sans tasks,
but MtHk structure roversed. Group number three first received the lins task
structured as chance, then the color task structured as skill. The fourth
group received the- awns tasks, but with structure reversed. Each subject
went through a series of 10 trials on each task and all received the sajue
pattern of fixed rainforeemsnt
.
It was further hypath«seiw«9d tte,t people vary along a continuum of to
what extent they tend to more or less categorise all situations as achieve-
ment situations or fes chance situations. Consoqusntly, subjects with high
achievement scores would make lower expsctanoy statements in both skill and
chance situations than, subjects with low achievement scores. Subjects with
high scores on the chance qua stionnains would tend to stats higher expec-
tancies for success in both skill and chance situations than will subjects
with lew chance scores.
The major findings of this study were:
1. There is a significant difference in the expectancy statsiisnts given
in a skill and . htr-cs situation, but not as predicted. Instead, the study
showed higtapr ^l^ct-.^cy statements in a situation structured as skill rather
than a situation, structured as c*s.nee* Various explanations for this result
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were given. The subjects questioned s»id that they would mtbsr bat r»r© cn
their own ability, rather than on aorasthing 9Wf which they had no control.
2. It also could not be shown that people on either end of the chance-
skill dimension over-generali ze . That la, it could not be shewn that a
highly chance-oriented person would tend to perceive the skill situation as
aaore like chance than one who was skill (achievement) or non-chance oriented;
or a skill-oriented person would tend to see both situations jnore as skill.
Two possible explanations for the results were offered.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TASKS
AN EXAMPLE OF A STANDARD COLOR
A.N 5XAMPI.E OF A. MATCHING COLOR
AN E^KPL? OF A STANDARD LEHCTH
AN EXAMPLE OF /. IfATCHTNO LENGTH
APPENDIX B
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Name
Below are a number of statements which represent widely held opinions
on various questions. These stateiusnts were selected from several sources
such as speeches, books, newspapers, etc. They were selected in such a way
that most people are likely to egrea with MM mi disagree with others.
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements, as
follows J
rircl* SA. if you strrr^'y a^rca .
Circle A if you agree.
Circle D if you discftr-je .
Circle SD if you strongly disagree .
Please check the way you really feel, end not the way you think you
"should" feel.
SA A D SD 1. Many of the unsuccessful points in my life have contained a
large chance element,
SA A D 3D 2. A great deal that happens to me is probably just luck.
SA A D SD 3» I fe«l that many people could be described as victims of
circumstances.
SA A D SD 4. I have found that getting a good job is largely a function
of being in the right place at ths right tin».
SA A D SD 5. I've found that it's hard for me to really profit from my
past experience because I don't know how much of it to
attribute to luck or goal fortune.
SA A D 3D 6. Almost invariably, when I have been sick (virus, infection,
etc.) it was because I just happened to be exposed to it.
SA A D SD 7. One's grades in class depend as much on such things as the
instructor's mood, his choice of questions, maiking system,
etc., as on one's having been really prepared or not.
SA A D SD 8. I have usually found that what is going to happen will happen
regardless of my actions.
SA A D 3D 9. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are
controlled by accidental occurrences.
SA A D SD 10. It seems to me that the behavior of others is so unpredictable
that my actions are not too important.
SA A D SD 11. I feel that simply because something good happens today does
not mean that I should expect more of the same.
SA A | 3D IS* It is usually true that with successful people good luck
outweighed the bad.
SA A S 3D 13. It usually turns csit that we eight just as well have made
raany of our dacisions by flipping a coin.
APffiNDIX C
tmOMRAi INSTRUCTIONS
INSTRUCTIONS
GROUPS I AND III
You are going to be given two tests. I'll explain the first one and
have you finish it and then we will go into the second one.
The first one is a test that was constructed to measure interior decor-
ating aptitude. However, the way I am going to administer it, it will not
give any information about your interior decorating skill. It is purely a
luck or chance sort of thing.
Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a shade of yellow
(length) which will be exactly like one in the series of shades of yellow
(length) on the board over there. After I show you your card, you match it
with one on the board. Read the number of the card on ths board that matches
your card and I'll tell you whether you are right or wrong. However, there's
a trick here. Generally, you have to outguess me, because I will have al-
ready decided, according to a fixed pattern, whether you are going to be
right or wrong. It still is important for you to try and match the shades
of yellow (lengths), as there is a pattern, which I can't tell you about,
which, if you discover it, will help you to outgusss me. Is that clear?
You can see that skill in matching here is not involved, but rather, how
lucky you are in guessing whether I win tell you that you are right each
time. Thus, even though it is a test of interior decorating aptitude, your
score won't give much of an indication of your ability here.
Another thing, I want to get an estimate of whether you expect to be
right or wrong in your matching each time. You will estimate how you are
going to do by betting these chips each time. You can bet any amount from
one to ten each time depending on what you think your chances are of guessing
right. The better you feel your chances are, the more you should bet, and
vice versa.
Is everything clear?. (pause) All right, let's begin. Don't
forget, this depends on luck rather than 3kill in interior decorating.
Presentation of the first task
Now let '8 do the second task. This is a test that shows how much ability
and aptitude you have for interior decorating. Your score on this test is
determined purely by how good you are. In other words, this tests your basic
skill and competency by comparing your perfonnance with that of other girls.
I suppose every girl likes to think she has ability in this area, Well, this
will give you a chance to really prove or demonstrate just how good or how
poor you are. Let ma say again that your scores rest solely on your basic
aptitude and are compared with those of other girls
.
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Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a length (shade of
yellow) which will be exactly the same length (shade) as one in the series
of lengths (shades of yellow) on the board over there. After I show you
your card, you match it with one on the board like we did before and I will
tell you whether you are right or wrong.
Another thing. As before, I want you to provide me an estimate of
whether you expect to be right or wrong in matching each time . Remember you
can bet any amount from one to ten each time according to what you think your
chances are of being right.
Okay? Let's begin. Don't forget, this test depends on skill and will
show definitely just hois really good or bad you are. You bet according to
what your expectancy for being correct is.
Presentation of ths second tai,k
36
INSTRUCTIONS
GROUPS II AND IV
You are going to be given two tests. I'll explain the first one and
have you finish it and then we will go into the second one.
The first one is a test that Shows how much ability and aptitude you
have for interior decorating. Your score on this test is determined purely
by how good you are. In other words, this teats your basic skill and com-
petency by comparing your performance with that of other girls. I suppose
every girl likes to think she has ability in this area. Y/ell, this will give
you a chance to really prove or demonstrate just how good or how poor you
really are. Let me say again that your scores rest solely on your basic
aptitude and are compared with those of other girls .
Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a shade of yellow
(length) which will be exactly like one in the series of shades of yellow
(lengths) on the board over there. After I show you your card, you match
it with one on the board. Read the number of the card on the board that
matches your card and I'll tell you whether you are right or wrong.
Another thing. I want to get an estimate of whether you expect to be
right or wrong in your matching each time. You will estimate how you are
going to do by betting these chips each time. You can bet any amount from
one to ten each time depending on what you think your chances are of being
right. The better you feel your chances are, the more you should bet, and
vice versa.
Is everything clear? (pause) All right, let's begin. Don't
forget, this test depends on skill and will show definitely just how really
good or bad you are. You bet according to what your expectancy for being
correct is.
Presentation of the first task
Now let's do the second test. This test was also constructed to measure
interior decorating aptitude. However, the way I am going to administer it,
it will not give any information about your interior decorating skill. It is
purely a luck cr chance sort of thing.
Here is how we will run the test. I will show you a length (shade of
yellow) which will be exactly like one in the series of lengths (shades of
yellow) on the board ever there. After I show you your card, you match it
with one on the board like we did before. I will tell you each time whether
you were right or wrong. However, there's a trick here. Generally, you
have to outguess me because I will have already decided, according to a fixed
pattern, whether you are going to be right or wrong each time. It still is
important for you to try and match the rectangles (shades of yellow), as
there is a pattern, which I can't tell you about, which, if you discover it,
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win help you outguess me. Is that clear? You can see that skill in match-
ing here is not involved, but rather, hov; lucky you are in guessing whether
I will tell you that you are right each time. Thus, even though it is a
test of interior decorating aptitude, your score won't give much of an indi-
cation of your ability hare.
Another thing. As before, I want you to provide me an estimate of
whether you expect ro be right or v.rong in your matching each time. Remember,
you can bet any amount from one to ten each time according to what you think
your chances are of guessing right.
Okay? Let's begin. Don't forget, this depends on luck rather than
skill in interior decorating.
Presentation of the second task
APPENDIX D
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Experimental Tasks
bj ect Chance Mean Skill Mean
1 4.11 4.89
2 3.44 5.67
3 3.22 2.67
k 4.56 5.56
5 3.00 3.89
2.78 3.89
7 6.00 6.11
I 6.44
ft rte%7.78
9 7.5b 6.11
10 9.44 10.00
11 5.56 7.00
12 5.78 4.78
13 3.89 3.44
14 5.33 6.22
15 4.56 3.11
16 4.11 5.56
17 2.00 2.00
18, . 56
fa r- /7.56 7.22
19 1.67 1.67
20 3.56 5.22
21 7.00 6.78
22 6.11 5.56
23 5.00 5.44
24 5.33 7.78
25 6.22 7.89
26 5.00 8.00
27 4.33 5.56
28 5.00 8.89
29 4.44 4.78
30 3.00 2.78
31 4.00 6.39
32 5.78 6.22
33 3.78 5.78
mt 3.11 3.33
35 5.00 10.00
36 3.11 4.67
37 4.11 6.67
38 4.00 6.00
39 1.22 3.11
40
X * J. ik 3-11
LI**x 1.67
X. 1.11
/i3 4.67 6.78
44 Ml 5.00
45 4.11 7.22
46 1.22 1,89
47 6,6? 10.00
48 5.78 5.00
49 6.11 6.73
50 6,00 7.33
}
Questionnaire Snores
Subject Total Score
1 34
2 38
3 31
k 26
5 35
6 39
7 35
8 35
9 41
10 37
11 40
12 32
13 39
14 43
ij 37
16 35
17 35
3.8 33
if 37
20 43
21 39
22 41
23 36
24 39
25 38
Sub j ect Total Score
26 40
27 42
28 41
29 4.1
30 39
31 35
32 42
33
34 43
35 34
35
37 30x
38 34
39 39
40 41
u 35
42 35
43 32
44 43
45 33
46 28
47 36
48 35
49 37
50 36
Edwards Pcreor.al Pr0f9rer.ee Schedule
Achievement Hank Scores
L> UU, j v/v w Rank 5»£*ofp Sub 1 cat Rank fi^ora
i 11 5am} 26 S « *'
1 Ci l /. sXA, »
U.I J? AO XV
12X/C • 2Q X-J »
in t1U • p ] 1XX «
IV 1 ftxu. > ^12X 7
7
/ 7» "32 Q C
ft 1 11JJ
c
I 5 UJH 1 2x*. •
in 1%J? i nXv .
11 o« If - *j
12 Xtf. ft
13 10. 33 5.
14 3.5 39 9.5
15 4. 40 5.
It 12. u 10.
17 13. 42 12.
IS 14. 43 15.
19 13.5 44 12.
20 5. 45 13.5
II 10. 46 5.5
22 6.5 47 9.
23 12.5 43 13.
24 12.5 49 8.
25 2. 50 11.5
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The major purpose cf this stud;.' vra.-r to Investigate the effect of a
situational variable on verbal statements of expectancy. It was hypothesized
that the subject who categorises z situation as skill would give lower state-
ments of expectancy than subjects who categorise! a situation as chance.
This prediction was based in part on Y-'orell's study where goals cf high value,
which were related to ability or skill, resulted in lower statements of ex-
pecumcy than in those situations which had low goal values.
In order to test this hypothesis two experimental tasks were desired.
One involved the matching of colors and the other, the matching of lengths
of lines. A total of 50 female subjects were uoed, broken down into four
groups. Group one first received the color task structured as c lance, then
th' line task structured as skill. The second group received the same tasks,
but with structure reversed. Group n.uiber three first received the lino task
structured as chance, then the color task structured as skill. The fourth
group received the same tasks, but with structure reversed. Each subject
went through a series of 10 trials on each task and all received the same
pattern of fixed reinforcement.
It was further hypothesised that people vary along a continuum of to
what extent they tend to more or less categorize all situations as achieve-
ment situations or as chance situations, ftntrnmitilj. subjects with high
achievement secret; would auke loner expectancy statements in both skill arid
chance situations than subjects with low achievement scores. Subjects with
high scores on the chance questionnaire would tend to state higher expec-
tancies for success in both skill and chance situations than will subjects
with low chance scores.
2The major findings of this st^Hy 7"j*§i
1. There is a significant difference in tho socpactanflp statements given
in a skJ.ll and chance situation, but not as predicted. Instead, tin .study
shcned higher expectancy statements in a situation structured as sidli rather
thai in a situation strucViared as chance. Various explanations for this re-
sult were given. The subjects questioned said that they would rather bit
more on their own ability, rather than on something over which they had no
control
.
2. It also could not be shew: that people on either and of the cLunce-
sVd.ll dimension over-generalize. That is, it could not be shown that a
hip..ly chance-oriented person would tend to per ceive the skill sdtuHticn as
more like chance than cno r;ho was skill (aahi<3veaiM%) or non-chance oriented:
or | skill-oriented person *ould tend to see bfi&h situations acre as skill.
Two possible explanations for the results were offered.
